CERD/C/63/CO/6 para. 14. 9 With the sole exception of the Convention on the Rights of the Child all of these human rights instruments have been signed and ratified without any reservation. The Convention on the Rights of the Child is also the only major human rights treaty Iran has joined since the establishment of the Islamic Republic and it has been signed and ratified with the reservation that it will not apply any provision of the Convention which is incompatible with Islamic law. 10 justify breaches of internationally recognised human rights standards by references to Islamic law. 11 By the term Islamic law the I.R. Iran exclusively refers to Islamic law in the interpretation of the Shiite ğafari school of law, 12 the religion of the majority of the Iranian people and the official creed of the Iranian state. 13 These observations show that at least in the interpretation prevailing within the administration of the I.R. Iran, Islamic law and international law, in particular human rights law, are inconsistent in various aspects. In order to answer the question whether the I.R. Iran may invoke Islamic law to successfully justify breaches of international law, this article analyses the relationship between Islamic law and international law both from the perspective of international law and Iranian domestic law. As will be demonstrated, the latter establishes a kind of multilayer system between Islamic law, domestic law and international law.
The first section will provide a short overview of the Islamic legal terminology. The second one assesses the significance and rank of Islamic law and international law respectively according to the Iranian legal system. In the final section the conflict between international law on the one hand and Islamic law and the Iranian Constitution on the other will be examined including possible options provided by the different systems to bridge the conflict. It should be mentioned that due to the may be contrary to the Islamic Sharî'a, and preserves the right to make such particular declaration, upon its ratification." Upon ratification: "The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran reserves the right not to apply any provisions or articles of the Convention that are incompatible with Islamic Laws and the international legislation in effect." 11 complexity of the topics and restrictions of space, the following analysis will concentrate on structural discrepancies of the different legal systems. For discussions on individual conflicts between Islamic law and international law in detail, the reader is kindly asked to refer to the multitude of publications focusing on these special topics. 14
II. The Terminology of Islamic Law
The expression "Islamic law" is generally applied to refer to the whole system of law connected to Islam. It therefore is used as a generic term encompassing both the primary sources of law, which are also referred to as the šarî'a, and the rules which are derived from the šarî'a by Islamic legal science (feqh/fiqh). 15
-šarî'a
The Arabic term šarî'a in the religious context refers to the way God has stipulated for men which was heralded by his messenger, the prophet Mohammad. 16 The šarî'a is composed of the two primary sources, Koran und sunna. 
-feqh/fiqh
The Arabic term feqh or fiqh in Persian is translated by "to comprehend" and "to understand." 18 It refers to Islamic legal science. 19 Due to the character of the šarî'a as God's law and the codification of his will, its origin and validity cannot be questioned by Islamic legal science. Therefore feqh exclusively focuses on discovering the will of God as expressed in the šarî'a and applying it to individual cases whether real or hypothetical. 20 The objective of Islamic legal science is to interpret the will of God for the assessment of human behaviour. 21 Feqh is therefore described as the knowledge of the legal norms for individual cases, derived from the sources of law. 22 Since the šarî'a, according to Islamic doctrine, has to be regarded as a comprehensive legal system, which is, however, in need of interpretation and concretisation, the object of feqh is to assess and regulate all aspects of life on the basis of the šarî'a. Hence, there is no possibility of feqh beyond the šarî'a. However, both terms are interrelated since the šarî'a is depending on feqh to facilitate an assessment of concrete, external human actions. 24 A decisive difference is that whereas the rules and principles of the šarî'a are perceived as being impeccable, eternal and resistant to change, the results and regulations reached by feqh may be modified due to the passing of time and change of circumstances. 25 A fatvā is a legal opinion of a scholar of Islamic law (faqhih; pl. foqhohā) 26 based on the šarî'a and the application of the methods of feqh. 27 The foqhohā can rely on four methods to derive rules from the šarî'a and establish them. These methods are also referred to as the usul al-feqh. 28 These four sources of law are categorised into primary and secondary sources. The first of the primary sources is the deduction of rules and principles by the interpretation of the Koran. The second is the application of the principles embodied in the sunna to individual cases. Secondary source of law both according to the ğafari school of 24 26 The term foqohā is the plural of faqih which means "expert" in Arabic. In the ğafari school of law it is used as a synonym for the term of a moğtahed. The term moğtahed in the terminology of ğafari law refers to a member of the ulamā who is accepted as an expert on the interpretation of Islamic law.
Prerequisite for obtaining such a rank are studies of Islamic law lasting many years at the end of which a person is awarded by its teacher the license (eğāze) to issue independent interpretations based on the application of his rational powers (aql). The teacher has to be a moğtahed himself. The process to reach a legal opinion based on rational consideration is called eğ-tehād. The term literally means the exertion of all abilities to achieve a certain aim. However, the two sects of Islam hold a different perception regarding the question under which circumstances a sufficient consent is given. 30 A further secondary source of law according to the predominant perception 31 of scholars within the ğafari school of law is reason ('aql). 32 Rather than reason, the Sunni schools accept only analogy (qiyās). 33 The difficulties regarding a correct delimitation of the terms šarî'a and feqh are aggravated by the phenomenon that authors frequently fail to differentiate between them. This means that sometimes the rules established by feqh are referred to as parts of the šarî'a. 34 However, to apply šarî'a synonymously to Islamic law as a whole is highly problematic because this means that the line between the impeccable rules which have been revealed by Koran and have been applied and demonstrated in the sunna on the one hand and the principally fallible human efforts of feqh on the other is blurred. 35 view all drafts passed by parliament regarding their compliance with Islamic law. 51 As an additional safeguard to ensure the superiority of Islamic law, the Constitution obliges Iranian judges to refrain from applying any executive decrees and regulations which are at variance with Islamic rules. 52 Therefore, according to the IC, Islamic law constitutes the superior law of the I.R. Iran, outranking executive decrees, parliamentary legislation and even the Constitution. 53 As can be discerned by an interpretation of article 4 IC read together with article 72 IC, it becomes clear that the term "Islamic law" in article 4 IC refers to ğafari Islamic law only. Hence, in the I.R. Iran all rules which are perceived by the competent organs as being at variance with Islamic law according to the ğafari school of law are invalid.
The Rank of International Law in the Iranian Legal System a. International Treaty Law
As was mentioned in the introduction, the I.R. Iran is party to most major international human rights treaties and with the sole exception of the Convention on the Rights of the Child has signed and ratified them without any reservation. Regarding the domestic effect of international treaties, article 9 of the Iranian Civil Code promulgates: Hence, treaty provisions, where the respective treaties have been ratified in compliance with the constitutional prerequisites, share the rank of regular parliamentary laws in the domestic hierarchy of norms. 55 As a consequence, Iranian law also provides for the possibility to invoke provisions of international treaties before domestic courts. The Iranian judiciary explicitly confirmed this finding in regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 56 Since the respective treaty provisions form an integral part of the Iranian legal order and share the rank of parliamentary legislation in the hierarchy of norms, in case of conflict between such a provision and a provision of parliamentary law the rule of lex posterior derogat legi priori is applied, according to which the more recent norm prevails. 57 However, since they share the rank of parliamentary legislation, international treaty provisions rank below the Constitution in the domestic hierarchy, which, from a comparative perspective, is quite a common regulation. Nevertheless, article 4 IC, according to which all norms including the Constitution itself must comply with Islamic ğafari law, provides for a peculiarity of the Iranian legal system. Since international treaties share the rank of parliamentary laws, and the latter according to arts 4 and 72 IC must not be at variance with Islamic law, international treaty provisions in the I.R. Iran are subordinated not only to the Constitution but also to Islamic (ğafari) law. Hence, it is consistent from a domestic point of view that deputies of the various Iranian administrations repeatedly emphasised that in case of conflict between provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Islamic law, the latter prevails. 59 In fact, there is evidence that the Iranian legislator promulgates theories which tend in the direction of strong monism giving precedence to domestic law and denying any binding force of treaty provisions which are inconsistent with Iranian domestic law or Islamic law. 60 Such tendencies are evident in the law 61 regulating the accession of the I.R. Iran to the Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 62 In spite of the fact that the I.R. Iran, upon signature of the Convention, only raised a reservation concerning its article 6 and did not make any reference to Islam or Islamic law, the accession act promulgated that treaty provisions which are at variance with domestic law or Islamic law are not binding for the I.R. Iran. 63
b. Rules of Customary International Law
Unlike the situation concerning treaty-based provisions, there are no provisions in the Iranian legal order regarding the domestic impact of non-treaty based rules of international law. According to Iranian doc- 59 trine, non-treaty based rules of international law become part of the domestic legal order only if they are transformed by a legal act. 64 From a domestic perspective this perception seems consistent. Arts 4, 72 and 170 IC are supposed to guarantee that in the I.R. Iran only regulations which comply with Islamic law are applied. Therefore, rules of customary international law can only be integrated into the Iranian legal system by a transformation act guaranteeing that these rules are not at variance with Islamic ğafari law.
Summing up, the Iranian hierarchy of norms establishes an absolute precedence of Islamic law as it is interpreted by the ğafari school of law. Hence, Shiite Islamic law enjoys superiority both to the Constitution and to treaty-based provisions of international law. Rules of customary international law have no impact on the legal system of the I.R. Iran as long as they have not been transformed into domestic law by an act of transformation which must comply with Islamic law in order to be valid. 65
IV. The Conflict between International Law and Islamic (ğafari) Law

The Conflict from the Perspective of Islamic Law
Islamic law perceives itself as an all-embracing and, as far as the šarî'a is concerned, as a divine legal order. In fact this legal order constitutes in itself a substantive part of the Islamic message of salvation. 66 Islamic law claims to encompass all aspects of life and to be authoritative for every Muslim, no matter if he lives in a country with a Muslim majority or not. 67 The relation of Islamic law to international law is much more complex. Although the claim of absolute validity held by Islamic law also encompasses international relations, this claim is not enforceable on the international level since it is beyond the power of Islamic states to enforce unilaterally the conformity of the international legal order with Islamic law. Hence, in order to provide information on the relationship between the two different legal systems it is necessary to analyse whether there are consistencies or divergences between them and how far the one may be subsumed into the other.
In order to do so, it is first necessary to give a short overview of the part of Islamic law which covers the external relations of the Muslims, the so called siyar. It must be emphasised straight away, however, that this term serves as a categorisation which is known in the Sunni schools of Islamic law only. Nevertheless, the siyar shall serve as the basis of the 68 elaborations because first, the rules of the Sunni schools of law are much more thoroughly researched and second, the categorisation of these rules in the siyar provides an excellent starting point for a comparison of the Islamic rules with other legal systems like international law. This is justified since, although a special category to match the Sunni siyar is missing in the ğafari school of law, which might be related to the exclusion of Shiites from the actual execution of government authority in the first centuries of Islam, there is an agreement in principle between the different institutes of the siyar and the parallel rules of the ğafari school. 71 Cases in which there are divergences between the two sects of Islam will be mentioned in detail.
In the course of the following section first the term siyar representing Islamic "external law" will be explained. This is followed by an analysis of the subjects of the siyar and its sources in which the structural differences between Islamic law and international law are demonstrated. As will be shown, although the siyar is often denominated as "Islamic international law", in fact only a very restricted part of it really can be addressed as international law. It is on this component of the siyar, which consists of Islamic international treaty law, that the final part of the overview will focus. In this part the requirements for the conclusion of international treaties according to Islamic law will be highlighted answering the question how far modern international law is consistent with the requirements of Islamic international treaty law.
a. The siyar as the Islamic "External Law" and an Overview of its Meaning
The Arabic term siyar is the plural of sîra which can be translated by "practice" or "shape." 72 In the context of Islamic law the term siyar refers to the practice of the prophet Mohammad in the course of his military expeditions and other forms of contact with non-Muslims. 73 In the early years of Islam the term siyar was used to refer to the narrative stories about the campaigns of the prophet and his companions out of which scholars of Islamic law, in the course of time, derived legal pre- 71 Cf. E. Kohlberg requisites regulating the treatment Muslims should bestow upon the outside world. 74 Therefore, the siyar in the first place analyses rules regarding the relation between Muslims and non-Muslims, no matter whether the latter were living as so-called Dhimmi ("protected people") under Muslim superiority in the territories conquered by the Muslims or in non-Muslim realms. However, the siyar also encompass regulations regarding apostates and rebels, even though the latter are Muslims themselves. 75 In order to understand the meaning of the siyar it is necessary to understand their conception as transitional regulations. They are based on the underlying perception that sooner or later the whole world will become part of the Islamic community, the umma, and therefore the siyar will become irrelevant once this transitional period is over. 76 Hence, the ultimate aim of the siyar is to guarantee peace in the territories already subject to Islamic law on the one hand, and to enlarge the realm of Islam on the other until it encompasses the whole world. 77 This conception renders the siyar an imperial system of law. In accordance with their basic conception, the siyar divide the world into two different categories of territories. On the one hand there is the so-called dār al-islām "the territory of Islam" and on the other the dār al-harb or the "territory of war". The siyar define the dār al-islām as the territory controlled by Muslims and subject to the laws of the šarî'a. 78 The term dār al-harb is attributed to the rest of the world which is controlled by 74 According to the siyar, the relationship with the world outside the dār al-islām is almost exclusively characterised by aspects of ğihad, 81 i.e. religious war, which is considered the regular situation between the two territories. 82 The participation in ğihad is a religious duty for every able Muslim. 83 The ultimate aim of ğihad is the islamisation of the nonMuslim territories which will render the siyar unnecessary. 84 However, war in the sense of ğihad is not necessarily a continuing deployment of 79 In particular in the doctrine of the Sunni shafi schools of law there is a third category beside the two, the so called dār al-sulh. Referring to the territories which have achieved an autonomy status within the Islamic empire by an agreement on tribute. However this category has not been accepted by the majority of the other schools. It has been correctly emphasised that a substantive characteristic of the peace treaty between the dār al-sulh with the dār al-islām is the acceptance of the suzerainty of the latter due to which this territories consequently are regarded as being part of the dār alislām by the other schools. According to the siyar only the community of Muslims, the umma, and its individual members are considered being legal subjects, whereas in contrast the dār al-harb and its inhabitants lack any legal subjectivity. 89 Rather the dār al-harb and its inhabitants are mere objects for the siyar and conquest in the course of ğihad. The political organisation of the dār al-harb is not recognised. It is regarded as legally indifferent (mubāh) 90 and as a merely factual organisation of power. 91 There are no differences between the Sunni and Shiite schools of law regarding this perception. Hence, the siyar like Islamic law as a whole, provide for a personally structured legal system that extends internal and unilateral regulations of Islamic law on the actions of Muslims towards the external (non-Muslim) world. 92 The siyar provide neither non-Muslim communities nor their individual members with the capacity to participate on an equal basis in the legal order and to influence its rules. This phenomenon constitutes the decisive difference between the regulations of Islamic law and modern international law, since in contrast to the rules of the siyar, Article 2 para. 1 of the UN Charter stipulates the principle of sovereign equality as one of the cornerstones of modern international law. 93 In consequence, international law is understood as the total of norms regulating the relations of states, international organisations and other subjects of international law that in its authority does not depend on its acceptance by individual states, but whose basic principles are accepted by the overwhelming majority of states as binding in their mutual relations. 94 In striking contrast the acceptance of Islamic law and its principles by non-Muslim individuals and states from the perspective of Islamic law is of no consequence to its validity. 95 According to the siyar there are principally no rules between sovereign and equal states but between believers and non-believers. 96 Hence, although the rules of siyar are often referred to as "Islamic law of nations" or "Islamic international law," 97 at least not the whole body of the siyar may be regarded as regulations of international law. 98 Rather the siyar share similarities with the roman ius gentium. Similar to the siyar the ius gentium was domestic Roman law which regulated the relation between Roman citizens and foreigners. 99 Hence, the siyar instead of "Islamic law of nations" have correctly been addressed as "external law" of the Islam. 100 Islamic law provides a scope for rules that really provide for mutual rights and obligations only in so far as it allows treaties between the umma and non- 93 Cf. G. Dahm Muslim states. 101 In these instances Islamic law provides facilities for legal regulations based on reciprocity and mutual acceptance. However, since treaties generally are not determined unilaterally, such treaties cannot be considered genuinely Islamic. Rather only the prerequisites that these treaties have to fulfil in order to be valid according to Islamic law are Islamic. In order to examine them in detail it will be necessary to come back to these aspects of the siyar which may be termed Islamic international treaty law.
First it is important to shed light on another fundamental discrepancy between siyar and modern international law, consequence to the concept of the umma in Islamic doctrine. 102 All schools of Islamic law concur in the perception that there is only one community of believers, one umma which in conformity to the unity of God is attributed with a uniform organisation and leadership. In consequence Islamic law claims that the umma has to be headed by a single leader. 103 Therefore according to Islamic legal doctrine the umma is principally indivisible and only the umma as a whole and its individual members enjoy legal subjectivity. Consequently there are no legal categories for fractions of the umma and hence no legal subjectivity. Therefore Islamic law in principal does not provide for legal regulations of the relations between different Islamic states. 104 A system of international law whose subjects are Muslim states is alien to Islamic legal doctrine. 105 cases. 106 Regularly they have applied the rules the siyar provide concerning rebellion and apostasy to give a legal assessment of the factual circumstances. 107 There was a heated debate within the Sunni schools of Islamic law whether the leadership of the umma is divisible or not. In the end the doctrine of its principal indivisibility prevailed and was maintained in spite of the factual fragmentation of the Islamic world. 108 In this regard there is no divergence between ğafari law and its Sunni counterparts. Although the former discerns between dār al-islām and dār al-imām, this categorisation is based on the difference between true believers and their territory, i.e. the dār al-imām on the one hand and such Muslims on the other who refuse to accept the authority of the Imāms and therefore are considered rebels. 109 Hence, since the beginning of the increasing fragmentation of the Islamic world, the siyar have reflected an ideal to strive for rather than provide a legal description of reality. Hence although there have been legal regulations concerning the relation between Islamic states, these were not based on the siyar but rather on practical considerations, and therefore Islamic law remained largely unheeded regarding questions of tribute and sovereignty between Islamic states. 110 Summing up, it has been established that there are fundamental differences between modern international law and the siyar. Points of contact exist only in so far as the siyar permit international treaties with non-Muslim communities. However, there are voices who, often by reference to the practice of Islamic states, argue that the siyar have changed in the course of the centuries and that today the identified structural differences between the two legal orders have been eliminated by an accommodation of the siyar to modern international law. By an examination of the different sources of the siyar it will be analysed whether this claim is correct and there has truly been an evolution of the siyar.
c. Evolution of the Islamic "External Law"?
The decisive factor for understanding the sources of the siyar as well as the respective institutes of the ğafari school of law and thereby for answering the question whether the practice of Islamic states has led to an evolution of the Islamic "External Law" is to understand that the siyar do not form a separate part of Islamic law following rules of its own. Rather they constitute an integral part of Islamic law and are therefore based on the general sources of law, i.e. Koran, sunna, consent (iğmā) and reason ('aql) as far as the ğafari school of law is involved and analogy (qiyas) for the Sunni schools of law respectively. 111 In concurrence with the usul al-feqh the siyar were mainly developed out of the sunna of the prophet Mohammad, i.e. the traditions of his military campaigns and his practice of government vis-à-vis non-Muslims. In contrast, the practice of subsequent Muslim rulers or states according to Islamic legal doctrine might only be regarded as a source of law in case these rulers have been specially distinguished and hence their actions might be categorised under one of the sources of Islamic law. 112 This could be considered if their conduct could be interpreted as being part of the sunna. However, in Shiite law beside the prophet himself this quality is only ascribed to the twelve Imāms, and only the first Imām 'Alî Ibn Abî Tālib actually wielded state power as the fourth caliph. On the Sunni side, at most the state practice of the first four caliphs who are also called the rightly guided ones might be attributed such quality. Although their actions are not deemed themselves part of the sunna, special significance is attributed to them regarding the confirmation of the sunna of the prophet since they have been his trusted companions (ashabā). In contrast, the practice of other Muslim governments can neither be regarded as a source of law for the siyar nor for the rest of Islamic law. From the Shiite point of view, the insignificance of state practice for the evolution of Islamic law is increased by the fact that according to traditional Shiite doctrine until the return of the twelfth Imām, every worldly power is stained by the blemish of illegality. It was not until the advent of Ayatollah Khomeini and his doctrine of the rule of the supreme religious scholar that this dogma was challenged and this doctrine is still rather the perception of a minority within Shiite Islamic law. 113 Moreover, there is no hint that the followers of this doctrine perceive the actions of the supreme religious scholar as a source of Islamic law.
Since the practice of Islamic states is no source of law for the siyar, the variances Islamic states allowed from its rules in their relations to other states were not sufficient to reform the siyar. Hence, neither the rules governing the relation between the factually independent local potentates within the Islamic caliphate, whose number since the tenth century A.D. has increased more and more, nor the rules of international law which developed in the relationship between parts of the dār alislām and non-Muslim states, in particular on the Iberian peninsula, were able to herald an evolution of the siyar. 114 Another option for an evolution of the siyar could be a reinterpretation of its principles by the scholars of Islamic law in reaction to the practice of Islamic states. For instance, starting with the sixteenth century, there have been numerous treaties between the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Persia, 115 which due to the religious difference between the two realms necessarily had to be concluded on a rather secular basis. 116 117 It has been rightly highlighted that by these agreements both states, at least indirectly, had to accept that their actions should be separated from questions of religious doctrine and thereby they had to accept a secularisation of state practice and a mutual recognition based on the principle of equality and reciprocity. 118 However, although some authors deem it otherwise, 119 this did not result in a reform of the siyar. It has been rightly noted that there is no factual basis for such a perception. 120 By his detailed analyses of legal opinions of Ottoman scholars of Islamic law between the seventeenth and nineteenth century, Krüger has demonstrated convincingly that if they have given opinions on the relationship of Islamic states at all, they have applied the traditional categories of the siyar regarding rebellion and apostasy rather than adapting the siyar to the reality of a multitude of independent Islamic states. 121 Therefore the war against Safavid Persia was regarded as a police action only slightly different from actions against highway robbers. 122 However, this categorisation could hardly provide a correct description of reality, because the major part of the Safavid territory had never been under Ottoman rule. The categorisations undertaken by the Islamic scholars motivated by political opportunity were meant to pro- 115 In particular the treaty of Amasya of 29 May 1555 as the first formal peace treaty between the two empires should be mentioned. 121 Krüger, see note 69, 124 et seq. 122 Krüger, see note 69, 124 et seq. As Krüger convincingly demonstrates these advisory opinions due to reasons of political opportunism applied rules of the siyar to situations on which they were hardly applicable.
vide reality with the pretence of Islamic legitimacy. 123 Hence, the relation between the two empires was based on rules that had no basis in Islamic law but rather were born out of the necessities of the mutual relationship. 124 As detailed analyses show, neither did the actions of the Ottoman Empire towards non-Muslim nations and the legal opinions issued by the scholars of Islamic law in this regard led to a reform of the siyar. 125 Since neither the Sunni nor the Shiite scholars of law undertook a reinterpretation of the siyar in reaction to the changes of state practice, it must be ascertained that a true reform of the siyar and the respective "external law" of the ğafari school has not been achieved until today. Even though there are several approaches to achieve such reform, 126 none of these has been accepted by a significant number of scholars of Islamic law. Therefore, the perception of a slow convergence of Islamic law and international law over the centuries lacks any evidence. 127 Islamic legal scholars, no matter if of Sunni or Shiite creed, have tended to perpetuate the ideas established by their ancestors in the early centuries of Islam rather than to observe the factual state practice. Thus the rules of Islamic law became more and more detached from the rules and regulations derived from factual state actions. 128 Hence, the only possible conclusion is that Islamic law and present international law represent two fundamentally different legal systems.
d. Islamic Treaty Law as a Point of Contact between Islamic Law and International Law
However, in spite of this finding it might be possible to subsume modern international law into the prerequisites of the Islamic law of international treaties. The siyar and also the respective rules of the ğafari 123 Krüger, see note 69, 125 et seq. 124 school of law explicitly provide for the possibility of treaties between Muslims and non-Muslim communities. 129 Moreover, Muslims are religiously obliged to fulfil treaty obligations. The rule pacta sunt servanda is derived inter alia directly from the Koran and therefore enjoys paramount importance in Islamic law. 130 All Islamic schools of law concur in the perception that this is both a legal and religious obligation. 131 The obligation to fulfil treaty obligations also includes treaties concluded with non-Muslims. 132 Even though treaties do no constitute a source of Islamic law, they nevertheless influence its content indirectly, since the fulfilment of a treaty becomes a religious duty for the community and the individuals bound by the treaty. Therefore, if the content of modern international law could be subsumed under the prerequisites of Islamic treaty law, even though this would not change the fundamental difference between both legal systems, international law as a permissible treaty arrangement would also nevertheless be binding from an Islamic law perspective. In order to examine whether this is the case, the prerequisites and limitations the siyar and the ğafari school of law establish concerning treaties will be examined in detail.
aa. The Treaty of Protection (muwāda'a) as a Facility to suspend ğihad and its Prerequisites
It has already been mentioned that according to the basic concept of the siyar the normal condition between the dār al-islām and the dār al-harb is ğihad. 133 However, under certain conditions the siyar allow agreements with the dār al-harb suspending ğihad. 134 Such a treaty is called a muwāda'a. 135 The instrument of muwāda'a is based on the tradition of the prophet Mohammad, who negotiated an armistice of ten years with the then still non-Muslim people of Mecca in Hudaibiya in the year 628 AD. This tradition being part of the sunna of the prophet is also recognised by the ğafari school of law 136 and since the ğafari school establishes rules regarding circumstances under which a muwāda'a might be cancelled in case of ğihad it may be deduced that it also accepts the instrument of muwāda'a. 137 It is characteristic for the siyar and the respective regulations of ğafari law that as a consequence of the permanent state of war between the dār al-islām and the dār al-harb, it is the suspension of ğihad which necessitates special justification rather than warfare. 138 However, as may be observed by the treaty of Hudaibiya, permanent warfare was practically unfeasible, even in the times of the prophet. Hence a muwāda'a might be negotiated in case the aim of the ğihad, i.e. the conversion of the non-Muslims to Islam, cannot be achieved by armed combat at the moment. 139 Such an agreement must focus on a certain legal consequence and has to fulfil the general prerequisites Islamic law introduces for treaties to become valid. 140 A muwāda'a not only encompasses the cessation of hostilities between the parties and thereby suspends an ongoing combat, such a treaty moreover includes a temporary mutual guarantee of security from the military actions of the signatory and may include services in return. 141 For a treaty to become valid, the person acting on the Muslim side must be competent to conclude a treaty. It is very interesting that according to Islamic legal doctrine, in principle, every individual Muslim is competent to conclude a muwāda'a. 142 Although the scholars of Islamic law tried to limit the mandate to conclude treaties at least internally to the leader of the umma or the leaders of groups of the umma, internal prohibitions, even though they render the perpetrator liable to punishment could not affect the validity of the agreements. 143 Therefore the lack of legal subjectivity of Islamic states according to Islamic law has had no effect on the mandate of its leaders to conclude a muwāda'a.
The siyar does not establish any prerequisites concerning the position and competences of the person acting on the non-Muslim side of the treaty. Therefore the non-Muslim treaty party may be a king or any other sovereign within the dār al-harb, or a tribe, or a city. The decisive factor is only that the treaty partner wields factual power over his subjects and is recognised by them as their ruler. 144 A muwāda'a might also be concluded with Muslim rebels or apostates. 145 However, it should be emphasised that a muwāda'a, like any other treaty, must respect the limits of the šarî'a in order to be valid according to Islamic law. 146 As has been already mentioned, the major challenge in legal doctrine regarding the muwāda'a is the question under which circumstances such a treaty and the imminent suspension of the duty to wage ğihad is justified. 147 Moreover, in accordance with the circumstances surrounding the treaty of Hudaibiya such treaties must have a temporary character with a maximum duration of ten years. 148 149 The ğafari school of 142 Kruse, see note 72, 103. 143 Ibid., 103. 144 Ibid., 104; Mössner, see note 103, 78. 145 Krüger, see note 69, 133; Khadduri, see note 74, 222, 234. Concerning rebels a argumentum a fortiori is applied, by arguing that if it is allowed to conclude such an agreement with unbelievers it must be even more so regarding Muslims. In regard to apostates the possibility of such agreements is justified by comparing them with the inhabitants of the dār al-harb. 146 Salem, see note 67, 198; Ford, see note 14, 521; Bigdeli, see note 111, 44 et seq. 147 Krüger, see note 69, 121; Salem, see note 67, 199; Kruse, see note 72, 101 et seq. 148 In the hanafi and maliki school of law the maximum duration is fixed at between three and four years, because the Meccans broke the treaty prematurely. In detail Khadduri, see note 67; also, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, 1955, 134; Ford, see note 14, 504 note 23; Pohl, see note 14, 81.
law concurs with its Sunni counterparts in the perception that a muwā-da'a between Muslim and non-Muslim communities must be temporary if the non-Muslims do not accept the suzerainty of the Muslims. 150 Concerning possible justifications for a muwāda'a with non-Muslims, the various schools of Islamic law concur in the perception that necessity might be such a justification, e.g. due to a temporary superiority of the non-Muslim forces. 151 The ğafari schools of law and parts of the Sunni schools deem a muwāda'a also permissible if it serves the interests of the Muslims. 152 However, in this case the Sunni schools of law reduce its duration to four months. 153 A particularity of ğafari law is the suspension of the duty to participate in aggressive ğihad, i.e. ğihad aiming at the extension of the Muslim territory, until the advent of the twelfth Imām. 154 Based on this particularity of ğafari law there is a temporary armistice (hudna) with the opponents of the Shiites until the return of the twelfth Imām, as long as their opponents do not undertake actions which render defensive ğihad obligatory. 155 A muwāda'a triggers a fundamental change in the relations between the umma (or its part) and the respective non-Muslim community for the duration of the treaty. Whereas Islamic law generally perceives states within the dār al-harb as a mere factual organisation for the execution of power without any legal significance, 156 by the conclusion of a muwāda'a the community associated with the umma by the agreement enters the horizon of Islamic law since the muwāda'a legitimises the existing legal organisation of the respective state in the view of the umma. 157 Due to the mutual recognition for the duration of the muwā-da'a there is a valid and common norm for the actions of both communities and the legally deficit status of the non-Muslim state is healed for the purposes of the treaty. 158 The possibility of a muwāda'a to be based on equality of the parties and to encompass temporary mutual recognition is already implied in the text of the treaty of Hudaibiya. 159 In its text all references to a superior rank of Mohammad and to his position as prophet and messenger of God are avoided. 160 Hence a muwāda'a constitutes a temporally and regionally limited legal system between the participating states. 161 In consequence, the muwāda'a serves as an instrument to establish temporary relations based on equality between Muslim and non-Muslim states and therefore has been denoted correctly as nucleus of a law of international treaties within Islamic law. 162 The concept of muwāda'a has vividly been labelled a compromise between idea and reality, whose basis is the political and military need for the Muslim community to reach a ceasefire and thereby to become a subject of bilateral treaty law. 163 Therefore it might be possible to interpret modern international law from an Islamic law perspective as a form of muwāda'a, based on the necessity for the umma to accept the reality of a permanent coexistence of different states.
bb. Modern International Law as a Form of muwāda'a?
A major argument for the perception that Islamic law accepts modern international law as a form of muwāda'a is that Islamic law by allowing the institute of muwāda'a arranged for a legal institute by which mutual obligations between states might be established. Moreover, the fulfilment of these obligations is ensured by the superior importance the rule pacta sunt servanda enjoys in Islamic law. 164 However, first it should be remembered that Islamic law does not accept the partition of the umma into different states. Therefore according to the rules of Islamic external law, treaty regulations between Muslim states might only be concluded under the fiction that each of the parties regards the other one as rebel or apostate. Such a perception is however hardly consistent with the principle of sovereign equality as a basic pillar of modern international law.
Second, a muwāda'a between Islamic and non-Islamic states according to Islamic law has to be temporary. One might be tempted to rely on an implied extension of a treaty as long as it has not been terminated, to achieve a permanent commitment to treaties which possess permanent character. However, the compliance of such a solution with the temporary nature of treaties according to Islamic law would be a mere farce.
Finally from the perspective of Islamic treaty law, the binding nature of customary international law for Islamic states is hard to explain and might be achieved by the fiction of an imaginary conclusion of a respective treaty. Although Islamic law in principle accepts customary law as subsidiary source of law, 165 it is accepted only under the condition that Islamic law is silent in the respective matter and that the rules of customary law do not breach other rules of Islamic law. 166 Since the muwāda'a provides prerequisites for a suspension of ğihad exclusively there is no room for customary law in these matters.
Therefore Islamic law on the one hand and modern international law on the other form two separate and different legal systems. Although there are overlaps between the two systems, since some principles like pacta sunt servanda are recognised by both, the fundamental differences mean that modern international law cannot be explained in terms of Islamic law.
In spite of the discrepancy between the two systems, there is no doubt that today Islamic states perceive themselves as being principally bound by international law. 167 This is demonstrated in particular by the fact that all states with a majority Muslim population have decided to join the United Nations and to participate in its various principal and subsidiary organs. The acceptance of the principles and aims of this or-ganisation by all of these states is demonstrated vividly by the fact that the preamble of the Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, 168 which all these states have joined, explicitly emphasises the commitment of its members to the Charter of the United Nations. Even the I.R. Iran, which has relied repeatedly on Islamic law to justify breaches of internationally recognised human rights standards, has demonstrated constantly that in spite of discrepancies between Islamic law and international law, it perceives itself principally bound by the latter. 169 For instance although in the course of the hostage crisis in 1979/80 the I.R. Iran refused to appear before the ICJ and challenged the jurisdiction of the court it did not base a single argument on Islamic law, but rather referred to the interventions by the United States in Iran since the 1950s, which they deemed relevant for the case and therefore refused to accept a decision limited to the actual occupation of the embassy. The I.R. Iran did not challenge being bound by its international obligations, and explicitly emphasised the respect the I.R. Iran held vis-à-vis the court and its merits for peaceful reconciliation. 170 The I.R. Iran based all its arguments on categories of international law rather than Islamic principles. 171 To refer to a more recent case, also in the course of the present dispute on the Iranian nuclear programme, the I.R. Iran avoids any references to Islamic law but instead bases its arguments on international law invoking the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency to plead its case. 172 Historic examples provided by several authors give evidence that in spite of the rigidity of Islamic legal doctrine, already in former times the practice of Islamic states demonstrated that these states adjusted their actions to the necessities to accept the reality of a permanent coexis- Although the author can endorse this finding in large part, there is the important constraint that neither Islam nor Islamic law has really accepted modern international law because the voices of the scholars of Islamic law supporting a reinterpretation of Islamic law consistent with modern international law in general and human rights in particular remain scarce and have still not prevailed. 175 Hence, although Islamic law is still at odds with international law, Islamic states have largely accepted the binding character of the latter in spite of its discrepancy to Islamic law.
There are multiple articles and statements which purport the consistence of both legal systems by evading problematic regulations like the temporal limitations of the muwāda'a or by claiming that the practice of Islamic rulers which has not been consistent with the siyar resulted in its reform. 176 The latter perception which is, for example held regarding the actions of Islamic rulers on the Iberian peninsula is based on the argument that the respective rulers have perceived themselves as extremely orthodox and Islamic and therefore their actions in defiance of traditional siyar must either reflect a reform of the siyar or must have led to this reform. Lohlker deems it unlikely that these strictly orthodox and pious rulers might have failed to follow the regulations of the 173 siyar. 177 However, this perception has no hold in Islamic legal doctrine. As has been examined in detail above, the practice of Islamic states and its rulers is principally no source of Islamic law and there is no hint for a reinterpretation of the siyar which might have been reflected in the practice of these rulers and their communities. Moreover, Krüger has provided ample evidence that the Ottoman Sultans who perceived themselves likewise as devout Muslims and as the keepers of orthodoxy within Islam, had departed substantially from Islamic law and the siyar concerning their international relations. However, Islamic law has neither been reformed by this discrepancy nor by Islamic scholars in reaction to the practise of Islamic states. 178 Hence, Islamic law, perceiving itself as a comprehensive legal system of an absolute character, can accept modern international law only in individual aspects but not as a whole. However, regarding the practice of Islamic states this discrepancy remains largely irrelevant, since these states have adopted their actions principally to the rules of international law. There are just a few instances when Islamic states reject their commitment to international treaties with the argument that these are inconsistent with Islamic law. Islamic states and in particular the I.R. Iran mostly tend to raise this claim regarding the universal validity of human rights. 179 In order to avoid treaty obligations inconsistent with Islamic law many Islamic states have raised reservations regarding regulations which are at variance with Islamic law when joining multilateral treaties. 180 However, the I.R. Iran, from time to time, has also contested its obligation to fulfil treaty provisions which it perceived inconsistent with Islamic law even though it had not raised any reservation in this regard when signing and ratifying the treaty. 181 In the following section the conflict between both legal systems and the consequences of the discrepancies between the international obligations of an Islamic state and Islamic law will be analysed from an international law perspective.
The Conflict between the two Systems from the Perspective of International Law a. Islamic ğafari Law
From an international law perspective, the relation between Islamic law and international law is quite problematic. Whereas the state is the principal subject of the religiously neutral international legal order, Islamic law perceives itself as an ideal and timeless legal system which has been established by God rather than men. Its only subjects are the umma and the individual Muslims.
One may contemplate whether Islamic law or at least the šarî'a as its core might be regarded as a particular system of international law between Islamic states. However, it has been demonstrated that the very structure of Islamic law is opposed to the idea of a legal system between different states regulating its mutual relation on the basis of sovereign equality. Therefore only individual regulations of Islamic law might be part of a particular system of international law but not Islamic law as a whole. Hence, although Islamic law perceives itself as an absolute legal order which claims to be binding on every Muslim, it has no direct relevance within the system of modern international law. However, in some cases Islamic law might acquire an indirect relevance since it constitutes one of the major legal systems in the sense of Article 9 of the para. 12 et seq.; cf. also the Iranian law on the ratification of the Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of the United Nations, see note 62. 182 Mayer, see note 14, 201; Farhang Rajaee, see note 11. 183 Salem, see note 67, 198; Ford, see note 14, 521.
Statute of the ICJ. 184 Due to this qualification and based on Article 38 para. 1 (c) of the Statute, Islamic law can have an impact on the adjudication of the court. 185 186 Besides, the key for understanding the relation between international law and Islamic law lies in the fact, that with the exceptions mentioned above, Islamic law acquires relevance for international law only insofar as Islamic states orientate their domestic legal systems towards Islamic law. Moreover, they tend to raise reservations upon signature and/or ratification of multilateral treaties which they perceive to be partly inconsistent with Islamic law; this happened in particular regarding human rights treaties. Hence, Islamic law in spite of its own claim to absolute validity is dependant on states adopting and recognising it as part of their domestic legal system and thereby taking over its effective implementation. Although millions of Muslims around the world might interpret Islamic law as binding for themselves, it is the individual state which chooses to introduce and enforce Islamic law of a certain school within its domestic sphere. 187 If an individual state, like the I.R. Iran regarding the rules of ğafari law, integrates Islamic law into its domestic legal order, Islamic law becomes effective as part of domestic law. Therefore, in the following the relation between domestic law and international law will be analysed.
b. The Relation between Domestic Law and International Law from an International Law Perspective
Even though there is no rule in international law according to which domestic law being inconsistent with the international obligations of a state becomes automatically void, 188 it is recognised that if domestic law is at variance with international law, the state is obliged to amend its 184 Cf. B. Fassbender, "Art. 9", in: A. Zimmermann/ C. Tomuschat/ K. Oellers-Frahm (eds), regulations in accordance with the latter. 189 The principle that states have to adjust their domestic law to their international obligations and may not invoke it to justify breaches of international law has already been recognised in the Alabama Arbitration of 1872 and has been constantly confirmed by international courts since then. 190 Also article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 191 stipulates:
"A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
Since the principle invoked in the article is a codified rule of customary international law, 192 it is binding also on states which, like the I.R. Iran, have not yet ratified the Convention. In consequence, no matter which rank the respective norm of domestic law enjoys, a state may not invoke it to elude its international obligation. 193 This principle derives from the argument that the actions of the legislator including the constitutional legislator cannot be regarded as actions of a third person acting outside of the responsibility of the state. 194 The state, as a subject of international law, is bound to fulfil its obligations and cannot provide an excuse not to do so. 195 Therefore even the claim that special constitutional requirements prevent necessary amendments of domestic law does not affect international obligations. 196 It is interesting to note that in spite of tendencies of the Iranian legislation regarding its domestic law as being superior to international law, Iranian legal science recognises the duty of the state to adjust its laws to international norms as being an evident and basic requirement to ensure the effectiveness of the international legal order. 197 Due to this principle Islamic ğafari law as any other domestic law including the Constitution may not be invoked by the I.R. Iran to avoid its international obligations. Hence, even though article 4 IC demands all laws to be based on Islamic law and not to be inconsistent with its rules, this regulation does not affect the international obligations of the I.R. Iran. As a result the I.R. Iran is internationally liable inter alia to fulfil its human rights obligations no matter whether these are partly deemed inconsistent with the ğafari law and therefore with the Iranian Constitution. Although the I.R. Iran due to the peculiarities of its Constitution might not fulfil its international human rights obligations without fundamental changes of its constitutional order, this requirement nevertheless does not affect its international obligation to do so.
c. Options for Islamic States to Avoid International Obligations Inconsistent with Islamic Law
As has been elaborated above, the precedence of international law over Islamic law in spite of their fundamental differences is mostly accepted by Islamic states with regard to their external relations. However, conflict arises if Islamic states reject being bound by individual norms of international law which in their opinion violate Islamic law. As said this almost exclusively takes place regarding the universal validity of human rights. Viewed from legal doctrine this claim is relatively unproblematic concerning treaty obligations as long as the respective states apply the regular instruments international law provides for such instances, i.e. they refrain from joining the respective treaties or they raise reservations to multilateral treaties regarding individual regulations.
aa. Reservations as an Instrument to Prevent Conflict between International Obligations and Islamic Law
Article 2 para. 1 d) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a reservation as:
"[…] a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State." 198 This definition is a codification of customary international law 199 and therefore is also binding on states which are not party to the convention.
A valid reservation therefore provides states with an instrument to exclude the application of individual regulations of a treaty on itself without being forced to refrain from joining the treaty. Several Islamic states have used this instruments when signing and ratifying the human rights instruments mentioned in the introduction. However, the I.R. Iran has raised a reservation only in regard to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It has declared that it reserves the right not to apply any provisions or articles of the Convention that are incompatible with Islamic law and the international legislation in effect. 200 Aside it should be mentioned that there is substantive doubt regarding the validity of reservations that, without any concretisation, reject the com- mitment to all regulations of a treaty inconsistent with Islamic law because, in order to be valid, a reservation must be specific and its scope must be clearly distinguishable. Otherwise it would not be feasible for other State Parties to understand its scope and decide whether to object. 201 In case of a blanket reservation not to be bound by any regulations inconsistent with Islamic law this is hardly possible, because particularly with non-Islamic states, a detailed knowledge of Islamic law cannot be expected.
Moreover, there are a multitude of different interpretations of Islamic law which are partly conflicting. Finally, it is not even clearly distinguishable to which school of Islamic law the reservation refers. Unspecific reservations are in particular problematic concerning human right treaties. It is convincingly held that reservations to such treaties must not be so unspecific as to prevent individuals from understanding the scope of their rights established by these treaties. 202 law. 204 It is questionable whether the argumentation of the Iranian government has any basis in international law and whether there is an option for Islamic states to solve such conflicts in favour of Islamic law without violating their international obligations.
As a consequence to the lack of direct relevance of Islamic law within the system of international law, there is no direct consequence in respect of the international obligations of Islamic states if these obligations violate Islamic law. Therefore there is no basis in international law for refusing per se any obligations of Islamic states which are inconsistent with Islamic law in general or the šarî'a. Hence, the idea of a "silent" implied reservation of Islamic states to any such obligation must also be rejected. Moreover, such a reservation would be diametrically opposite to the bona fide principle because if a "silent" reservation were valid there would be no certainty for the parties to a treaty whether the other parties are bound by the treaty and to what extent. Finally, States Parties must have the option to react to a reservation and to object to it, which would be hardly feasible in case of a "silent" reservation.
A final possibility for the I.R. Iran to avoid obligations inconsistent with Islamic law would be to presume a subsequent reservation raised after the Islamic revolution concerning international obligations which are inconsistent with the šarî'a or Islamic law in general. However, a reservation must be raised at the latest together with the last act necessary for the binding effect of the treaty. 205 This principle of customary international law has been adopted in arts 2 para. 1 d) and 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and due to its customary law character is also binding if the Convention is not applicable. Hence, such a reservation would not be valid. Although even an invalid reservation might be recognised by the other States Parties, there is no possibility for such a recognition since the I.R. Iran never officially made such a reservation.
Hence, there is no doubt that the I.R. Iran is also bound by the treaties joined before the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, although Ayatollah Khomeini declared his opposition to everything inconsistent with Islamic law no matter whether constitutional provisions or international treaties. 206 According to the well-established principle of the continuity of states, the identity of a state is not affected by changes of its constitutional system, no matter if changes have been of a revolutionary character. 207 Therefore each subsequent administration inherits the international rights and obligations established by its predecessors. 208 Moreover the principal commitment to the human rights treaties joined by the pre-revolutionary government was expressively acknowledged by the I.R. Iran. 209 Further evidence is given by the fact that the I.R. Iran never contested its obligation to provide reports to the Human Rights Committee following from article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Therefore, with the exception of the Convention on the Rights of the Child the I.R. Iran may not invoke any reservation to justify violation of its treaty-based obligations to protect and ensure human rights. A conflict between treaty obligations and Islamic law can only be prevented by a valid reservation. Since the I.R. Iran only raised a reservation to the Convention on the Rights of the Child it is bound in full to the international human rights conventions ratified prior to the revolution and may not reject its obligations established by these treaties based on the argument that these are (partly) inconsistent with Islamic law or the šarî'a. In case of conflict between Islamic law and international law, from an international law perspective the latter prevails. 210
V. Conclusion
Islamic law recognises domestic law only insofar as it is consistent with Islamic law. The Iranian legal system tries to solve this problem by conceding superior rank to Islamic ğafari law and ordering domestic law to comply fully with it.
According to article 4 IC, Islamic law is perceived as the basis of all Iranian laws and regulations, and every norm including the Constitution has to be interpreted in the spirit of it. This principle also affects the impact of international law on Iranian law, since article 9 of the Iranian Civil Code establishes that international treaties joined by the I.R. share the quality of parliamentary legislation which ranks below the Constitution. Hence, provisions of international treaties according to the domestic hierarchy of norms rank below both the Constitution and Islamic law.
From an Islamic law perspective international law can only be accepted as far as it complies with the former. However, there is no real "Islamic international law" in existence, since the siyar are not based on the principle of equality of states but constitute a personal legal order whose only subjects are the umma and its individual members. Hence, there is in principle no room for a coexistence of different states in Islamic law. Options for a relation between states based on equality are in existence only insofar as the siyar authorises international treaties. The prerequisites for such treaties according to the siyar might be addressed as Islamic law of international treaties. However, also in this respect there are fundamental discrepancies between the siyar and modern international law. Hence, both systems differ substantially and share points of contact in individual aspects only.
Nevertheless, this conflict is of practical relevance concerning only a very limited number of topics, because all Islamic states have in principle, accepted the validity of modern international law and have adopted their state practice to its prerequisites to a very large extent. However, concerning human rights Islamic states and in particular the I.R. Iran have repeatedly emphasised that several aspects of the internationally established human rights standards are inconsistent with Islamic law and/or the šarî'a according to its traditional and still predominant interpretation. The šarî'a as the "Constitution of Islamic law" enjoys superior rank within Islamic legal doctrine and any treaty inconsistent with it is invalid. Therefore from an Islamic law perspective at least the šarî'a must prevail in case of conflict. In consequence, it must be argued that from the perspective of Islamic Law Islamic states cannot be bound by any international obligation contradicting the šarî'a no matter whether this obligation has been established by treaty or customary international law.
From an international law perspective neither the IC nor Islamic law can affect the international obligations of the I.R. Iran. Otherwise a universal system of international law would not be feasible. Islamic law is part of domestic law and the obligation to adjust domestic law to the international obligations of a state is a well established principle of international law. Islamic states might rely only on the regular instruments provided by international law to exclude the application of certain provisions, i.e. reservations to treaties and objections to norms of developing customary international law which contradict their interpretation of Islamic law or the šarî'a. Legal devices like "silent" or subsequent reservations must be rejected as they have no basis in international law.
Hence, the I.R. Iran is bound in full by international human rights treaties ratified before the Islamic Revolution of 1979, no matter whether or not the rights established by these treaties are perceived as consistent with Islamic law or not.
